From Remus Enterprises 1, LLC v. Breecedetermined Thursday by the D.C. Court docket of Appeals (Choose Shanker, joined by Judges Easterly and Ruiz):
Punctuation issues. On the coronary heart of this case is the position of a comma. Appellant Remus Enterprises 1, LLC (“Remus 2023”) sued appellee Quinn Breece in Superior Court docket asserting tort claims arising out of Remus 2023’s alleged possession of, and want to promote, a parcel of property positioned at 3308 sixteenth Road, NE, in Washington, D.C. However a consent judgment in one other case established {that a} completely different entity with a reputation containing all the identical phrases and letters however a in a different way positioned comma—Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC (“Remus 2018”)—was the actual proprietor of the property. As a result of Remus 2023 doesn’t have standing to sue based mostly on a unique entity’s property curiosity, we conclude that the trial courtroom lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and we affirm the trial courtroom’s dismissal of Remus 2023’s criticism, though on grounds completely different from these relied on by the trial courtroom….
The consent judgment on this case meant to conclusively settle the difficulty of who bought, owned, and contracted to promote the sixteenth Road property. First, the textual content of the consent judgment helps this conclusion. It makes particular “factual findings,” associated to that situation: that (1) Remus 2018 bought the sixteenth Road property in February 2023; (2) the deed of switch for that property contained a typographical error such that the identify of the transferee mistakenly learn “Remus Enterprises 1, LLC” somewhat than the right identify, “Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC”; (3) Remus 2023 didn’t buy and doesn’t personal the sixteenth Road property; and (4) Remus 2018 entered right into a contract to promote the sixteenth Road property. The presence of those findings within the stipulated consent judgment submitted by the events and issued by the courtroom helps the inference that the events “particularly agreed” to be sure by the courtroom’s dedication of these points….
Our decision of the standing situation follows ineluctably from our decision of the collateral estoppel situation. The consent judgment within the Nasi case discovered that Remus 2018, and never Remus 2023, bought, owned, and contracted to promote the sixteenth Road property. Within the case earlier than us, Remus 2023 was the only plaintiff, and it sought to base its damage on its alleged buy, possession of, and contract to promote the sixteenth Road property. However as a result of we afford the consent judgment within the Nasi case preclusive impact (and likewise in gentle of the allegation within the criticism itself that Remus 2018 owned the property), Remus 2023 can’t allege an damage based mostly on its buy, possession, or sale of the sixteenth Road property. And since Remus 2023’s claims derive fully from an alleged damage to Remus 2018’s property curiosity, we conclude that Remus 2023 has not suffered an “damage the truth is” adequate to present it standing. Subsequently, the trial courtroom lacked subject material jurisdiction over the case, and dismissal of the criticism is suitable ….
{We be aware that Remus 2023’s counsel represented at argument that he was the only member of each LLCs, and that possession of the sixteenth Road property at one level transferred to him. However no allegations relating to these details seem within the operative criticism, and Remus 2023 didn’t develop any argument addressing what implications, if any, this state of affairs might have on the decision of the standing query on this case.}
Jude E. Wikramanayake represents Breece.
